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We investigate how the successes and failures of people who initiate radical ideas influence (a) the inclination to takenew personal initiatives and (b) the outcome of those initiatives. Using the data of 1,792 radical ideas suggested
by 908 employees in a multinational firm’s idea and innovation program, we unexpectedly find that failures, rather than
successes, of initiators increase the likelihood of repeat initiative taking. We confirm our hypothesis that involving initiators
with prior success in initiative taking has a positive effect on the outcome of a subsequent radical initiative. Our findings
illustrate how learning unfolds in the context of radical initiatives and provide insights into how managers can support
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Introduction
Managers increasingly rely on their employees to take
the initiative, go beyond their assigned tasks, take
charge, and initiate new ideas in addition to their day-
to-day jobs (for reviews, see Crant 2000, Frese and Fay
2001, Grant and Ashford 2008, Grant and Parker 2009).
People who take initiative, for instance, submit concepts
for potential new markets, propose new product and ser-
vice ideas, and/or initiate changes in work processes,
making them safer and/or more efficient (Frese et al.
1996, 1999; Morrison and Phelps 1999; Parker et al.
2006; Unsworth 2001). Especially radical or disruptive
ideas or initiatives can be very rewarding for firms and
can be a source for strategic renewal (Burgelman 1983).
Radical initiatives are exploratory in nature; they dif-
fer from earlier initiatives and thus require a new set of
knowledge and a departure from already existing compe-
tencies (Levinthal and March 1993). Although they can
be considered fairly rare events, radical initiatives can
lead to fundamental changes in an organization’s tech-
nological trajectory and customer base, thereby allowing
firms to transform their competitive position.
Managers who want to capitalize on radical initiative
taking face two issues. First, they have to decline many
initiatives because only a few can actually be imple-
mented. Because initiative taking is discretionary (initia-
tives are generated in employees’ spare time, in addition
to their day-to-day job), it is unclear how the rejection
of initiatives affects future initiative taking by the same
employees. For instance, employees could easily decide
to stop taking initiative if their ideas are rejected too
often. However, it is important that employees do not
take initiative sporadically but on a continuous basis.
Only when employees constantly think about new oppor-
tunities (Skilton and Dooley 2010) will their firms be
provided with a full pipeline of initiatives and there-
fore with the capabilities and opportunities to success-
fully compete (Burgelman 1983). Second, managers face
the question of how the quality of initiatives can be
improved over time. A high number of low-quality ini-
tiatives is costly to administer and to review (Kijkuit and
Van den Ende 2010). The question therefore is, what do
employees learn from prior initiative taking experiences
so that they repeatedly take initiative and generate mul-
tiple high-quality ideas over time? To answer this ques-
tion, we investigate how prior initiating experiences of
both focal idea initiators and contributors to an idea can
increase initiative outcome performance. In doing so, we
recognize that people who contribute to an idea but are
not the main initiator or champion of that idea can still
play an important role because they bring with them
important prior experiences (Madsen and Desai 2010,
Schwab and Miner 2008). Initiators can be considered
the owner and often the “brain” behind the initiative,
whereas other contributors help improve and develop the
initiative (see Howell and Higgins 1990 for a similar
differentiation between champions and non-champions).
Whereas prior studies shed light on the antecedents
or outcomes of initiative taking, the main contribution
of this study is to examine sustained, radical initiative
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taking. As such, we study how people who have already
proposed an initiative can leverage their experience to
create multiple high-quality initiatives. We take a learn-
ing perspective that concentrates on the consequences
of prior performance outcomes. These outcomes are the
foundation of individual learning, which may trigger
an adaptation or shift in the behavior of organizational
members (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011, Edmondson
et al. 2007, Levitt and March 1988). Instead of mea-
suring learning per se, we take the number and type of
prior performance outcomes as an indication for learn-
ing input. We consider repeat initiative taking and sub-
sequent initiative success as two important, observable
outcomes of the learning process. This process is under-
pinned by two learning mechanisms. First, we draw on
the mechanism of conditioning that shows that indi-
viduals repeat behavior that led to success and discon-
tinue actions that resulted in negative outcomes (Staddon
and Cerutti 2003, Thorndike 1927). Second, we draw
on learning curve research, which shows that individual
results improve with more experience (Levitt and March
1988, Wright 1936). This study further contributes to
these literatures as one of the first to directly address
these learning behaviors for nonrequired activities such
as initiative taking (Frese et al. 1999, Parker et al. 2010,
Unsworth 2001).
The setting of this study is the radical idea-suggestion
system of a multinational firm with archived data span-
ning 1,792 ideas suggested over the course of 12 years
by 908 employees. We consider the rejection of an ini-
tiative by the management as a failure and the adoption
or acceptance of an initiative as a success. As we will
explain later, the outcome and quality of an initiative is
mainly dependent on the idea inventor as well as poten-
tial contributors. Therefore, initiative success or failure,
even if categorized as such by individuals other than
the inventor and potential idea contributors, is a useful
and widely accepted indicator to make inferences about
the quality of an initiative and the inventor (Cattani and
Ferriani 2008, Mumford and Gustafson 1988). Success
does not mean that the “perfect” solution to a problem
is found but that idea initiators can carry on implement-
ing their idea, which may ultimately result in increased
organizational performance (McGrath 2001).
Contrary to our expectations, we find that it is ini-
tiative failure that is positively associated with repeat
initiative taking. Experiences of success are related to
subsequent initiative performance. Given that initiative
taking is becoming an increasingly essential element of
today’s work (Crant 2000, Frese and Fay 2001, Grant
and Ashford 2008, Grant and Parker 2009), these find-
ings reveal learning patterns that shape sustained and
high-quality initiative taking. By illuminating the learn-
ing behaviors that follow a prior initiative taking effort,
we advance literature, which, until now, has focused
more on the factors that can generally affect but not sus-
tain initiative taking. Our findings highlight important
differences between proactive behaviors and required,
job-related tasks of employees. As such, our study offers
insights into how employees make potentially different
inferences based on the outcome of a personal initiative
versus a required task. We also advance recent research
aimed at disentangling total experience into components
of success and failure (see Madsen and Desai 2010).
Hence, we focus on what can be learned from the differ-
ent outcomes of the behavior itself and thereby provide
important recommendations for firms wanting to stimu-
late continued and improved initiative taking behavior.
Theoretical Background
Personal Initiative
Grant and Parker (2009) have highlighted some emerg-
ing shifts in work design theories driven by rapid
technological advances, increased competitive pressure,
and more complex interdisciplinary jobs. Companies
are increasingly relying on employees who initiate
change and display entrepreneurial behavior proactively
(Burgelman 1983). These employees show personal ini-
tiative, defined as “a behavior syndrome resulting in an
individual’s taking an active and self-starting approach
to work and going beyond what is formally required
in a given job” (Frese et al. 1996, p. 38). Personal
initiative theory focuses on internal personal processes.
It is an active concept entailing aspects of self-starting,
proactive, and persistent behavior (Frese and Fay 2001).
The self-starting component emphasizes the voluntary
nature of this behavior, proactivity implies that people
react in advance to anticipated future problems or oppor-
tunities, and persistency entails that people do not give
up so easily so as to realize change (Frese and Fay
2001). A salient example of a product resulting from
initiative taking behavior by employees is ideas—for
instance, ideas to improve existing processes and prod-
ucts, to prevent anticipated problems, or to take advan-
tage of new opportunities.
Personal initiative is closely related to constructs such
as taking charge (e.g., Morrison and Phelps 1999),
proactivity (e.g., Grant and Ashford 2008, Grant and
Parker 2009, Parker and Collins 2010, Unsworth 2001),
organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., Podsakoff et al.
2000), as well as internal corporate entrepreneurship
(e.g., Jones and Butler 1992). Taking initiative dif-
fers from organizational citizenship behavior because it
focuses more on creativity and is grounded in a proac-
tive attitude (Frese et al. 1999). In contrast to certain
types of internal corporate entrepreneurship, taking ini-
tiative can result in, but is not limited to, the study of
internal venture creations.
In this study, our emphasis is not on why people start
generating initiatives but rather on how prior initiative
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outcomes relate to subsequent initiative taking and sub-
sequent initiative success. Our work is thus guided by a
focus on the outcome or product of initiative taking (Cat-
tani and Ferriani 2008). One assumption we make in this
respect is that those people who did generate at least one
initiative (our study population) have a higher inclination
to generally take initiative, as well as a higher level of
self-starting behavior, proactivity, and persistency than
those who never took initiative.
The type of personal initiatives that we are investigat-
ing in this study can best be classified as radical. Rad-
ical initiatives are an organization’s “raw material0 0 0for
strategic renewal” (Burgelman 1983, p. 1350). As such,
each of the radical initiatives that we investigate should
be different from an earlier initiative, and in principle,
the activity should be considered as a fairly challenging
task for which a great deal of energy and commitment
of people is needed (Van de Ven 1986). Although suc-
cessful radical initiatives can have a vast impact on an
organization, they can be considered as fairly rare events
compared with more incremental improvement ideas.
This is also because disruptive initiatives challenge the
status quo of an organization and therefore can cause
much organizational resistance (Dougherty and Hardy
1996). Because of the very nature of radical initiatives,
it is difficult to estimate the value and benefits such an
initiative can bring to the organization ahead of time
(Baer 2012).
Learning from Initiatives
It is important to study what people learn from outcomes
of personal initiatives for two reasons. First, employ-
ees could decide to stop taking initiative because it is
a discretionary activity; this in turn could damage the
innovative output of a company (Frese et al. 1996, 1999;
Morrison and Phelps 1999; Parker et al. 2006). Second,
companies should be interested in high-quality initia-
tives so that they invest their money and resources as
efficiently as possible (even on nonrequired activities).
In this regard, it seems logical that learning from prior
experiences would be an important strategy.
Conditioning and outcome improvement are two
mechanisms that could inform our understanding of
how learning unfolds between a past and a subsequent
action.1 Theories of conditioning are based on the law
of effect (Thorndike 1927, 1933) and imply that indi-
viduals learn based on the consequences of behavior
(Staddon and Cerutti 2003). As Greenberg and Baron
(2002, p. 56) explain, “Behaviors with positive conse-
quences are acquired; behaviors with negative conse-
quences tend to be eliminated.” Conditioning can be con-
sidered as a form of performance-outcome learning (e.g.,
Schwab and Miner 2008, Staddon and Cerutti 2003) and
is an important mechanism to consider because favor-
able initial outcomes are often seen as good predictors of
repeated behavior (see, e.g., Grant 2012). Equally impor-
tant to understanding learning is the classic outcome
improvement or learning curve notion, which implies
that desired results improve with experience gained
(Wright 1936). This theory rests on the old adage that
“practice makes perfect” and relates to a form of learn-
ing by doing (Levitt and March 1988). For instance, as
people perform tasks, they generate or seek feedback
(Ellis and Davidi 2005, Ellis et al. 2006), and this feed-
back then facilitates or is a critical element of active
learning (e.g., Katz-Navon et al. 2009). Similar to other
studies (e.g., Edmondson et al. 2007, Gino et al. 2010,
Madsen and Desai 2010), we draw on the mechanism
of outcome improvement to establish a link between an
experience and performance. Hence, for both condition-
ing (to do something again) and outcome improvement
(to do something better), experience serves as one key
ingredient from which people make inferences.
Experience can, of course, have different dimensions
and sources (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011, Argote
et al. 2003). Given the context of this study, we con-
sider the process, content, and motivational dimensions
particularly important. Process dimensions of experience
concern knowledge about the development stages, the
evaluation criteria, and managerial expectations in these
different phases; content dimensions of experience relate
to knowledge about the characteristics of a focal initia-
tive and how it matches with the company requirements,
current needs, or problems; and motivational dimen-
sions of experience indicate why certain performance
outcomes elicit more intense knowledge seeking and
acquisition than others. In our hypotheses’ development,
we will draw and elaborate on these different kinds of
dimensions to predict why certain idea initiators take the
initiative again and why they improve over time.
Hypotheses
Learning to Do It Again
First, we hypothesize about the effect of prior failure
or success experience on repeat initiative taking. There
is mixed evidence about this relationship. Initiatives are
often generated by people who are intrinsically moti-
vated (Frese et al. 1999, Morrison and Phelps 1999) or
goal directed (Carver and Scheier 1998, Miller et al.
1960). Intrinsically motivated people seem to choose
more difficult tasks in the absence of external rewards
(Shapira 1976) and are generally more motivated to
learn (Gong et al. 2012, Parker and Collins 2010). Peo-
ple that experience failure might seek increased risk
(Sitkin 1992) because prior failure can trigger a feel-
ing of being positively challenged (Amabile et al. 2005).
Feeling challenged, in turn, might stimulate individuals
to further experiment and come up with new propos-
als despite prior failures (Hamel and Getz 2004, Sitkin
1992). Especially in situations where a high failure rate
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can be expected, the effect of being positively challenged
may work particularly well. Hence, it could be the
motivational component of challenge, which is induced
through experiencing failure that stimulates repeat action
(Mikulincer 1989).
Moreover, error management literature (e.g., Frese
1995, Keith and Frese 2008, van Dyck et al. 2005)
has shown that making errors can instigate increased
exploratory behavior. Specifically, when people are
highly involved in an initiative, failure might also lead
to increased persistence (Carver et al. 1979, Locke and
Latham 1990) because people try to understand the
inherent causes of the failure or error or because the task
is very relevant to the self-definition of a person (Brun-
stein and Gollwitzer 1996). On a related note, initiatives
are also sometimes generated by those who follow more
goal-directed action (Carver and Scheier 1998, Miller
et al. 1960). This means that they perform an action until
the discrepancy between an input function and a refer-
ence value is resolved—in other words, until a goal is
achieved or abandoned (Carver and Scheier 1998, Miller
et al. 1960). This could result in more idea initiatives
being submitted after a prior failure.
However, learning theory also suggests that successful
outcomes of prior activities result in increased repeated
efforts (Thorndike 1927, 1933). Behavior of people who
are successful is reinforced by positive feedback and
by direct or future rewards associated with the success.
The positive feedback that initiators get might motivate
them to take initiative again because they learn that their
company values successful initiatives. Positive feedback
about an initiative might also be understood as support
from management (Zhou and George 2001) and there-
fore an encouragement to take initiative again. Moreover,
performing well through personal initiative gives the
employee a feeling of recognition because there are gen-
erally few successful initiatives compared with the num-
ber of failed proposals screened through institutional-
ized processes (Fairbank and Williams 2001, Frese et al.
1999). Thus, experiences of success can also unlock a
more extrinsic motivational dimension as they indicate
that the idea inventor is performing very well.
In addition to this motivational dimension, process
experience might be another key ingredient from which
people make inferences. Successful initiative originators
have gone through all the possible development stages
and have gained more knowledge about the evaluation
criteria and expectations in these different phases. Sim-
ilarly, actions that are interpreted as positive provide a
base of familiarity and boost confidence in one’s abilities
(Levinthal and March 1993) that trigger repeat initiative
taking. Initiators might expect that the stocks of knowl-
edge they accumulate are best used again (Schwab and
Miner 2008). People therefore learn to make more use
of prior knowledge gained through initiative.
Although there are reasons to believe that both ini-
tiative failure and success might increase the repeated
generation of initiatives, we argue that employee ini-
tiative taking should still be reinforced more by prior
success experience. This has to do with certain features
of failure. For instance, failure can foster a feeling of
helplessness (Mikulincer 1989). It is also more diffi-
cult for initiators to maintain a high level of self-esteem
following failure. Moreover, perceived self-efficacy can
decrease with failure and with it the feeling of being
able to perform the task successfully in the future (Shea
and Howell 2000). Negative feedback teaches initiators
not to pursue the activity any longer (Shepherd 2003)
because future failures can be expected (Brunstein and
Gollwitzer 1996). Also, aspects of initiative behavior
itself might play a role. For instance, since initiative tak-
ing is discretionary by definition, it is easier for employ-
ees to decide not to take initiative any more. Finally,
initiators might fear appearing incompetent, an embar-
rassment they would generally want to avoid (Milliken
et al. 2003). To conclude, we hypothesize that experi-
ences of success more than failure stimulate the repeated
generation of initiatives.
Hypothesis 1. An initiator’s prior experience of suc-
cess increases the likelihood of repeat initiative taking
more than prior experience of failure does.
Learning to Improve
In our next research question, we address how prior fail-
ures and successes of initiators and contributors affect
the quality of initiatives. Again, there is mixed evidence
about the consequences of success and failure for out-
come improvement learning (Brunstein and Gollwitzer
1996). On the one hand, learning literature reports that
failure offers more opportunities for learning than does
success (McGrath 1999, Shepherd and Cardon 2009,
Sitkin 1992). Failures can draw attention to and sig-
nify particular problems with ideas (Hammond and Farr
2011). This is related to the content dimension of expe-
rience. Employees compare original plans with the out-
come, try to understand the performance gap, learn why
something failed, and plan actions accordingly (McGrath
1999, Miller et al. 1960). They may look for solutions
to problems, for instance, by searching and scanning
new information (Madsen and Desai 2010, Sitkin 1992).
In this respect, prior failure may also give employees
useful performance feedback (Frese and Fay 2001) and
an indication of how things should be done more suc-
cessfully in a future effort (Madsen and Desai 2010).
Error management literature has pointed out similar pos-
sible dynamics (e.g., Hammond and Farr 2011, van Dyck
et al. 2005). In an “error-friendly” environment, errors
inspire people to learn more about the situation that
caused the error in the first place, and, by instigating
this learning process, the same mistakes might not be
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made again, better approaches might be found, or com-
pletely new applications might serendipitously be iden-
tified, ultimately increasing performance.
On the other hand, a new stream of literature also
focuses on the value of learning from successes (Ellis
and Davidi 2005, Ellis et al. 2006). As successful ini-
tiatives are usually rare events (many are screened out
before an implementation decision is made), successes
generally stand out more than failures. Lampel et al.
(2009) show that rare events stimulate learning when
the event has a high impact on the organization and
is perceived as very relevant by managers and decision
makers. These events not only attract more attention
from managers and employees but are also perceived as
good and “rich” examples that stimulate reflection and
allow lessons to be drawn. Since successful radical ini-
tiatives are relatively rare events, they might be consid-
ered of greater value in terms of learning. Indeed, things
can always be improved in a next effort, and success-
ful experiences additionally give people the confidence
and enthusiasm to explore those remaining deficien-
cies. Moreover, people with experiences of success could
probably count on increased managerial backing that
could allow more freedom to explore new and even bet-
ter ways of performing tasks. In that sense, prior initia-
tive success unlocks the motivational dimension of expe-
rience (Frese et al. 1999, Morrison and Phelps 1999).
Experience of success also provides employees with
a frame of reference and proven routines (Gersick and
Hackman 1990). Successful initiators witness the devel-
opment of their idea from its inception to an implemen-
tation decision and therefore can see the bigger picture
behind a new initiative; they gain on the dimension of
process experience. Different elements of the initiative-
taking process can be contrasted with one another, allow-
ing employees to get a feeling for strategies that lead
to success (Kim et al. 2009). Moreover, for initiatives
to succeed, a match between the initiative and com-
pany requirements must be created. This is a process of
sensemaking in which both the initiative and the com-
pany requirements can be adapted. The initiator is con-
sidered to be the focal point for all enquiries and respon-
sible for articulating the benefits of an idea (Howell
and Higgins 1990). In doing so, earlier initiators gained
an understanding of how best to align company needs
with individual capabilities. Also, they learned about the
strategic values of a firm and how a new initiative could
cater to these values. The latter point thus concerns the
content dimensions of experience.
Although there are reasons to believe that both initia-
tive failure and success might increase subsequent initia-
tive success, we argue that the effect of prior experiences
of success should be higher than prior experiences of
failure. Although a failed initiative might not have as
many negative repercussions, it also creates less pressure
to learn. This holds particularly in a context where ini-
tiatives are suggested voluntarily and where every new
effort should divert from a prior one. In this environ-
ment, idea inventors are not dependent on the outcome
of their prior initiatives. This means that for initiators
who failed, it makes little sense to find out what was
wrong with an earlier initiative in terms of its content
so as to alter it in some way and resubmit an adapted
version of the initiative again. Given that every new ini-
tiative must explore new grounds and novel problems,
knowledge that initiators can gain from prior failures
is restricted to why earlier initiatives were not able to
solve a particular problem or why they were not the best
fit for the company. These experiences might be use-
ful when initiating and developing ideas becomes part
of a person’s job-related task or when an initiative can
be adapted in some way so that it might eventually
solve a certain problem within the organization. How-
ever, they might be less useful when considering the
quality of a subsequent but diverting new initiative. Fur-
thermore, failed initiators cannot gain experience related
to all phases of developing an initiative. This process
knowledge, however, might be more important for the
success of a subsequent initiative than the ability to
pinpoint deficiencies in a particular phase of initiative
development.
To conclude, we hypothesize that success more than
failure increases subsequent initiative success. We test
this line of thought looking at (a) the focal initiator and
his or her prior idea initiating experiences and (b) the
focal idea contributors and their prior idea initiating
experiences. Hence, we argue that, by and large, the
lessons from a prior idea initiating effort apply equally
to focal idea initiators and focal contributors who have
been idea initiators themselves in the past. However,
focal contributors with a history of successful initia-
tives might, in addition, be important for the success
of a focal initiative because they serve as experienced
“mentors” to the focal initiator. Research on mentor-
ship (for reviews, see Chandler et al. 2011, Haggard
et al. 2011) has shown that relationships between a men-
tor and a mentee are effective channels for stimulating
learning and redeployment of knowledge (McEvily et al.
2012). Much also depends on the motivation and abil-
ity of contributors to share their knowledge (Adler and
Kwon 2002). But through a process of vicarious learn-
ing, the knowledge as well as the experiences of the
earlier idea initiators might be leveraged for the focal
initiative. First, contributors can assist the focal initiator
in the initiative development process—for instance, by
transferring the lessons learned from their prior experi-
ences. As contributors to someone else’s initiative, they
are less attached to it and therefore might also voice
more critical comments that will eventually profit the ini-
tiative and improve its chances of success. Moreover, as
contributors who have succeeded with initiatives many
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times in the past, they can be considered experts in a
certain field. Their specialized knowledge and expertise
might be very useful in the initiative development pro-
cess, also because it potentially differs from the knowl-
edge and expertise of the focal idea initiator.
Hypothesis 2A. An initiator’s prior experience of
success increases the likelihood of initiative success
more than prior experience of failure does.
Hypothesis 2B. A contributor’s prior experience of
success increases the likelihood of initiative success
more than prior experience of failure does.
Method
Sample and Setting
Our study was conducted in an international energy com-
pany, which we call “Enco” for the sake of anonymity.
At Enco, we focus on a type of personal initiative that
relates to the generation and development of novel, early
stage ideas. Enco has set up an independent innovation
program to invest in these types of ideas. The program is
the advanced version of a suggestion box that companies
often use to stimulate, support, and channel personal ini-
tiatives (Fairbank and Williams 2001, Frese et al. 1999).
The program’s goal is to provide a sheltered space for
ideas that are radical in nature and to develop these ideas
further without a need to adhere to short- or midterm
business strategies. No financial rewards or bonuses are
issued for people who take initiative. The reward is to
work on an interesting idea for which the review com-
mittee will provide the necessary funding in case the
idea reaches the project status. Although they are not
compensated financially, employees can expect a certain
degree of recognition within the organization for suc-
cessful ideas. The firm’s review committee evaluates and
manages all of the incoming ideas and provides funding
and time so that people can further develop their break-
through ideas. Implementation of these ideas happens
within the business units of Enco or through technology
transfer companies, not by managers of the innovation
program. The managers are very explicit about the ideas
they are trying to source: they should radically trans-
form Enco’s position in the energy industry. Incremental
improvement ideas are not accepted by the innovation
program; instead, these ideas are transferred to other
people in the organization that might be better able to
use and develop them.
Enco’s innovation program is an independent unit in
the company that is measured by its ability to execute a
select number of ideas that are outside the scope of cur-
rent business strategy. The innovation program managers
can only perform well themselves when they sponsor
high-quality ideas. Sourcing radical ideas not only is the
ambition of the innovation program and its employees
but also is linked to the performance assessment of the
innovation program itself. Therefore, and as confirmed
by several interviewees, employees’ organizational posi-
tion, power, or status should not have a major influence
on the outcome or quality of an initiative. In other words,
innovation managers are mainly concerned with the con-
tent and quality of an idea, rather than with the status
or power of an idea inventor. As such, it is the content
of an initiative and the work that idea inventors put into
developing an idea that further define whether or not an
idea is successful. Innovation managers use the label of
“success” as feedback on the value of an idea, which ini-
tiators and contributors are responsible for (Greve 2003).
Enco’s innovation program database, comprising
information about thousands of ideas, served as the cen-
terpiece of our investigation. In addition to collecting
and complementing information from this database, we
attended team meetings, sat in on idea evaluation panels,
and held informal conversations with members of the
review committee. This qualitative data greatly helped
us to reach an understanding of the research setting
(Mintzberg 1979). We also had 25 semistructured inter-
views with recent initiators. Of these interviews, Table 1
highlights employees’ statements, from 10 exemplary
cases, regarding whether it would or would not matter if
their ideas were accepted or rejected.
One example of radical, proactive initiative taking that
we witnessed at the study site is an idea generated and
developed by one of the company’s engineers. His job
requirements did not include making such an effort, and
material science was not part of his direct expertise. Still,
he had an inspirational moment when watching a movie
about climate change. The concept behind the idea was
to bind company waste into a novel building material.
To pursue his idea, he convinced the company’s innova-
tion program to provide initial funding and thus proac-
tively developed an opportunity that he worked on in
addition to his normal duties, without receiving a bonus.
The outcome was very rewarding. It steadily increased
sales for a new innovation and motivated staff, who were
energized by being able to pursue their ideas. The idea
was not only considered radical because it opened a
new market for Enco but also because it was a com-
pletely new product with highly innovative features for
the existing materials industry. An example of an ini-
tiative that was not adopted was an Enco staff mem-
ber’s idea to produce electricity from wind motion with-
out using the conventional windmill. Initially, the idea
was considered favorably by the innovation group, par-
ticularly because it emphasized a new technology and
out-of-the-box thinking. However, after further discus-
sions with experts in the field and after a literature study
had been conducted, the innovation team did not further
support the development of this idea—most importantly,
because experts and prior studies revealed that the phys-
ical possibility of being able to generate electricity with
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Table 1 Examples of Positive and Negative Consequence Perceptions
Would it matter if your idea
Prior
Initiator submissions? 0 0 0was not accepted? 0 0 0was accepted?
Initiator 1 Yes “I expect that the people who evaluate my idea have
a much broader overview of what’s worthwhile to
pursue. I’ve got a lot of faith in the process and
think there’s probably some good reason behind a
rejection. I also see it more as a form of evaluating
the different possibilities and only a few of those
will really be implemented. It’s just part of the
game that most ideas won’t succeed.”
“I can see there are positive consequences.
However, for me, this wasn’t my main motivation.”
Initiator 2 No “It wouldn’t matter to me and it won’t stop me. I know
that things can change but not every idea can be
accepted.”
“It’s a real bonus if your idea is accepted. I’m sure
there’d be some link back to me. Of course, the
problem is the implementation. However, you’ve lit
the fire, and it’s nice when people recognize that
you were involved in something. I want to make
other people enthusiastic about my idea.”
Initiator 3 No “I can’t imagine any negative consequences for me
personally, and it certainly won’t stop me from
submitting more ideas in the future. The process is
very efficient, easy, and fair. I must say I’m pretty
impressed by it, and whenever I have a new idea,
I’ll approach the review committee again.”
“Of course, I think it would matter. You’ve picked up
on an idea and shown that you could bring it to
the market. You go through a steep learning curve
to be successful. It also enriches your normal job
because you learn new skills you can apply there,
too.”
Initiator 4 Yes “No, in fact, it can lead to many more new ideas and
projects in the future because you get some useful
feedback.”
“Yeah, sure. It would be beneficial for me but also for
the company. If my idea is funded, I get to decide
how and where to spend the money and get to
steer the idea. I can learn a lot from this.”
Initiator 5 Yes “No, not at all. What matters to me is that I can
propose those ideas, that I can bounce around my
ideas and potentially make a difference.”
“It’s really great if your ideas are accepted and
implemented. With more successes, I feel that my
ideas have also become much better. Now, I
immediately think of the economic aspects of an
initiative. It has taught me to think through the
basic principles and calculations behind an idea
more carefully.”
Initiator 6 No “I’d be lying if I didn’t get a bit grumpy. However, if
someone rejects my idea, I’d submit again in the
future. In fact, I’d be even more determined
because I want to be able to get around a
problem. I can’t let it go, I want to solve it.”
“Yes, there’s self-satisfaction. And you get your name
out and justify your place here. But that wasn’t
necessarily the reason I did it. I simply thought the
idea would be good and beneficial for [Enco].”
Initiator 7 No “Ideas have to make money or be beneficial so I
don’t really care if it isn’t successful because then
there are probably good reasons for not pursuing
it.”
“It’s really a challenge for me. It’s not directly part of
my job. If a few people think my idea is exciting, it
adds to the routine of my normal job.”
Initiator 8 Yes “Certainly it would be a real pity. Maybe it’s a missed
opportunity. It wouldn’t stop me but it wouldn’t
really encourage me either.”
“It’s a kind of combination of factors. It should bring
something good to the company and something
good to you.”
Initiator 9 Yes “No, doesn’t matter at all. I keep coming up with
ideas. It’s great that someone acknowledges your
ideas and gives you feedback. If people are
interested and they give me a reason why the idea
may or may not work out, that’s great.”
“Yes, I’d be very happy. The whole process brings
extra satisfaction to my job. I like being
entrepreneurial, I love solving issues—it’s fantastic
to see my idea become reality.”
Initiator 10 Yes “I want feedback about my idea; it’s great if this
happens. I always get constructive feedback from
the review committee. So even if an idea isn’t
accepted, I always get the chance to learn
something, and given my submission record, it
certainly isn’t stopping me from generating new
ideas.”
“Accepted ideas haven’t really helped my career.
But I just find it exciting to work on new
developments and ideas. It’s fun and also an
intellectual challenge. I learn a lot when my ideas
progress and are actually implemented.”
the proposed method (even given the benefit of doubt)
was highly unrealistic.
At Enco, an idea is always attributed to one initiator
who is in charge of the idea. It is primarily the choice
of the initiator to involve more people in his or her ini-
tiative. Idea inventors mentioned that they sought out
potential contributors for their highly specialized and
often very technical expertise. We also asked specifically
about other tasks that idea contributors could fulfill—
for instance, providing political or managerial support
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or helping to manage the process of getting an idea
accepted. However, none of our interviewees indicated
that people listed in connection with an idea were ever
contacted for these reasons. Again, this supports the
notion that status and power, also of the contributors,
does play less of a role in our context. As such, con-
tributors seemed to be involved mainly so that they can
share knowledge gained in previous initiatives.
The process of generating, developing, and evaluating
ideas is structured as follows. After the submission of
a short description of the idea, two main steps have to
be completed before funding is awarded. First, propo-
nents get the opportunity to briefly pitch their initiative
in front of innovation program team members. If this
first screening is passed, then the initiators get some time
to develop their proposal further. Second, following this
primary development phase, proponents present the idea
and project plan to a second panel of broader experts.
This panel assesses the potential, viability, and impact
of the idea. A decision is then made regarding a project
plan for the idea—whether and how to go ahead and
fund a proof of concept stage. If funding is awarded,
the proposal formally becomes a project. Throughout
the study we classify a successful idea as one that was
approved after the second panel and an unsuccessful idea
as one that did not get accepted after either the first or
second panel.
We extracted all information from the database in
November 2008. This sample consists of a 12-year
archive of 2,352 ideas. A data-cleaning procedure (tak-
ing out ideas that are still in progress, ideas that were
generated in workshops and therefore stimulated by an
external driver, and ideas not conceived by Enco staff)
resulted in an overall sample consisting of 1,792 ideas
generated by 908 initiators. We created two subsamples
from this data set, data sets A and B. Data set A was
used to predict the probability of submitting an initiative
idea in the future. For this dependent variable, we looked
over a time frame of four years following the last sub-
mission to see whether the initiator submitted another
idea; although this is consistent with former studies (e.g.,
Schwab and Miner 2008), it had an impact on our use
of the full data set in creating data set A. Specifically,
we needed to exclude all ideas submitted in the last four
years of our observation period, as initiators would not
have the same allocated time frame to submit another
idea. Data set B served to predict the probability of an
initiative’s success. This data set includes all ideas over
all years, but because our study depends on initiators
proposing their first idea with a clean slate—that is, no
previous experience of success or failure—we excluded
all first ideas from the dependent variable. Thus, the
outcome of the first idea was used as an independent
variable in our data set. Table 2 provides an overview
of the main data sets and shows the descriptive char-
acteristics of our dependent and independent variables,
outlined below.
Dependent Variables
Repeat Initiative Taking. Our measure of repeat ini-
tiative taking was binary, taking a value of 1 if an idea
initiator put forth an idea and submitted another idea
during the next four years and 0 if he or she did not.
Initiative Success. We classified ideas as successful
(i.e., we coded the variable with a value of 1 on a
binary scale) if they passed the second screening when
Enco reviewed the potential of the idea. Our observa-
tions revealed that managers often judged the success of
an idea at this point in time. Passing this screening panel
also meant that a substantial amount of resources was
allocated to further the execution phase. At this stage,
an idea would transform into a more formal project, and
responsibility for supervising the idea would partially be
transferred from Enco’s review committee to a business
unit.
Independent Variables
For the analysis of repeat initiative taking, we separately
tallied all successes and failures that the initiator had
experienced with both the focal initiative and any prior
initiative (initiators’ success experience and initiators’
failure experience). For the analysis of initiative suc-
cess, we separately counted all successes and failures
that the focal initiator had experienced in initiating prior
initiatives only (initiators’ prior success experience and
initiators’ prior failure experience). Similarly, for the
focal contributor of an initiative, we counted the prior
success and failure experiences of initiating ideas and
tallied them if there were more than one contributor to
an initiative (contributors’ prior success experience and
contributors’ prior failure experience).
Control Variables
Initiators who engage in the innovation program for
a longer time frame might gain a higher organiza-
tional standing over time, which could affect their
inclination to repeatedly submit ideas. Moreover, they
might develop specific relationships with the innovation
management program leaders, which could influence
whether their ideas turn out to be successful. Therefore
we control for initiators’ program tenure. This control
sums up the number of months an initiator is active prior
to submitting a focal idea, starting from his or her very
first idea submission.
We also controlled for the number of contributors
related to an idea. We included this variable to capture
the effect of a social net around an initiative. This social
net could be influential not only as a social support
instrument, encouraging initiators to continue generating
ideas, but also as a mechanism of bringing together dif-
ferent backgrounds and thereby enhancing the success
chances of an initiative (Hargadon and Bechky 2006,
Kijkuit and Van den Ende 2010).
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Table 2 Overview of Data Sets
Description Full sample Data set A Data set B
Panel A
N 1,792 1,390 887
Clusters 908 706 310
Difference from full — Ideas submitted in the Very first idea of
sample last four years excluded initiator excluded
Idea sequence 1–max 1–max 2–max
Time frame Nov 1996–Oct 2008 Nov 1996–Oct 2004 Nov 1996–Oct 2008
Dependent variable — Repeat initiative taking Initiative success
Purpose Descriptive statistics Main analysis Main analysis
and correlation matrix
Table(s) 3 4 and 5 6 and 7
Panel B
Full sample Data set A Data set B
Variable Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Repeat initiative taking 0.52 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50)
Initiative success 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30)
Initiators’ success
experience 0.12 (0.38)
Initiators’ failure
experience 3.69 (6.32)
Initiators’ prior success
experience 0.10 (0.40) 0.19 (0.55)
Initiators’ prior failure
experience 2.68 (6.20) 5.41 (7.92)
Contributors’ prior
success experience 0.03 (0.23) 0.03 (0.21)
Contributors’ prior
failure experience 0.44 (2.25) 0.56 (2.92)
Additionally, we controlled for several characteristics
related to an idea that could influence an employee’s
inclination to take initiative repeatedly, as well as to
generate initiatives that are better than previous ones.
Subsequent ideas that are similar to previous ones might
trigger repeat initiative taking because idea initiators
think that they should exploit their knowledge in a simi-
larly functional domain again (Schwab and Miner 2008).
However, if initiators submit ideas that are similar to
previous ones, it could be that these are just refinements
with little chance of being accepted. To capture the sim-
ilarity to previous initiatives of the same initiator, we
examined the given titles and counted how many relevant
words in the respective heading overlap with captions of
any idea previously submitted by the same initiator.
Ideas marked as confidential (dummy coded 1) are of
strategic value to the company and consequently appear
to be ranked as more important by Enco. Although Enco
uses three labels to classify initiative confidentiality (not
confidential, confidential, and very confidential), no idea
was classified with the lowest label. Although confiden-
tiality is not an ideal measure for how disruptive and
radical an idea is, in our interviews we gathered that
ideas classified as very confidential can be considered
the most radical because they were potentially deal-
ing with a breakthrough technology that could have a
high strategic value. For instance, one of the innovation
managers confirmed that “if you want to differentiate
between ideas which are all, in some way or other, rad-
ical, then the confidentiality marker is the best way to
do so.”
Recently submitted ideas are believed to be fresh
in one’s mind, more salient, and more easily recalled
(Levitt and March 1988). An employee who recently
took initiative might therefore have a higher chance
of generating another idea, because he or she is still
actively involved in creative thinking processes. Addi-
tionally, if initiatives are taken too quickly, it is possi-
ble that an employee is too attached to prior ideas that
could damage subsequent initiative success. To control
for this effect, we took the date an idea was submitted
and measured the number of months passed between a
prior submission and a current initiative submission by a
single idea initiator. This procedure gave us a measure of
time elapsed since previous initiative. We also included
a time variable indicating in which month the idea was
submitted since the inception of the innovation program.
This variable is included as a control because at the
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inception of an innovation program, many people might
submit ideas because no other outlet has been available
for this type of idea before. Also, when a new innovation
program starts, many people become aware of it, which
might trigger more idea submissions but not necessar-
ily better ones. Finally, we measured an idea’s lifetime
by taking the differences (in months) between the date
an idea was submitted and the date of the last activ-
ity or alteration pertaining to this idea. We incorporate
this measure into models regressing on repeat initiative
taking because a long initiative process might prevent
initiators from having the time and energy required to
generate a new idea.
Analysis
We used logistic regressions to estimate both the likeli-
hood that an idea initiator submits another idea in the
future and the likelihood that this idea is a success.
Since we find repeated observations for the same initia-
tor across time, we correct for the nonindependence of
observations belonging to the same initiator and report
robust standard errors adjusted for clustered observa-
tions of idea initiators (Audia and Goncalo 2007, Hallen
2008). Coefficients estimated through a logistic regres-
sion do not directly indicate effect size (Hoetker 2007,
Long and Freese 2006). Therefore, we use a variety of
methods to interpret the findings, including depicting
predicted probabilities of key independent variables and
calculating changes in predicted probabilities following
procedures suggested by Long and Freese (2006).
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4
1 Repeat initiative taking 0052 0050 0 1
2 Initiative success 0010 0030 0 1 −0002
3 Initiators’ prior success experience 0010 0040 0 5 0005∗ 0013∗
4 Initiators’ prior failure experience 2068 6020 0 46 0030∗ −0005 0010∗
5 Contributors’ prior success experience 0003 0023 0 4 −0005∗ 0021∗ 0003 −0005
6 Contributors’ prior failure experience 0044 2025 0 43 0000 0007∗ 0003 0008∗
7 Initiators’ program tenure 9078 18006 0 123 0013∗ 0014∗ 0037∗ 0039∗
8 Number of contributors 0066 1020 0 12 −0005∗ 0016∗ 0003 −0009∗
9 Similarity to previous initiatives 0033 0087 0 9 0014∗ −0001 0021∗ 0028∗
10 Initiative confidentiality 0027 0045 0 1 −0002 0022∗ 0003 −0014∗
11 Time elapsed since previous initiative 4022 10073 0 96 −0003 0013∗ 0015∗ −0001
12 Time 63078 32094 1 145 −0010∗ 0004 0013∗ 0016∗
13 Lifetime 10046 16077 0 103 −0001 0054∗ 0009∗ −0012∗
Variable 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
6 Contributors’ prior failure experience 0017∗
7 Initiators’ program tenure 0007∗ 0010∗
8 Number of contributors 0020∗ 0036∗ 0001
9 Similarity to previous initiatives −0003 0001 0026∗ −0002
10 Initiative confidentiality 0012∗ 0001 0001 0002 −0001
11 Time elapsed since previous initiative 0005∗ 0007∗ 0069∗ 0004 0009∗ 0008∗
12 Time 0004 0001 0030∗ −0026∗ 0004 0002 0018∗
13 Lifetime 0016∗ 0004 0003 0019∗ 0001 0019∗ 0006∗ −0008∗
Notes. N = 11792. Clusters = 908.
∗p < 0005.
Results
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the full sam-
ple (n = 11792). The average success rate of the full
sample was 10%, which confirms our claim that only a
small number of initiatives generally succeed. An initia-
tive was followed by a subsequent idea in 52% of the
cases. There appeared to be no significant correlation
between initiative success and repeat initiative taking.
The highest variance inflation factor (VIF) we encoun-
tered in our models regressing on repeat initiative tak-
ing is 3.08, with a mean VIF of 1.60; the highest
VIF in models regressing on initiative success is 2.61,
with a mean VIF of 1.45. Hence, multicollinearity did
not unduly influence regression estimates. We also per-
formed the Box-Tidwell transformation test and added
interactions between independent variables and their nat-
ural logarithm to each model (Hilbe 2009). Since no
interaction term turned out to be significant, nonlinear-
ity is not a problem. Moreover, because we used robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering, we applied Wald
tests instead of the more conventional likelihood-ratio
test (Sribney 2007). The reported Wald 2 statistics indi-
cate overall significance of the models. After fitting each
model, we also tested the significance of coefficients
that were added to the baseline model (Cameron and
Trivedi 2009).
Learning and Repeat Initiative Taking
Table 4 shows the results of the analysis where repeat
initiative taking is the dependent variable. For these
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Table 4 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Repeat Initiative Taking
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Initiators’ program tenure 0006∗∗∗ 0006∗∗∗ 0000 −0000 −0001
4000135 4000135 4000095 4000095 4000095
Number of contributors −0016∗∗ −0016∗∗ −0013∗ −0014∗ −0013∗
4000585 4000585 4000545 4000545 4000535
Similarity to previous initiatives 0024∗∗ 0024∗∗ 0005 0004 0001
4000925 4000935 4000725 4000715 4000715
Initiative confidentiality −0006 −0005 0014 0013 0014
4001845 4001855 4001455 4001455 4001435
Time elapsed since previous initiative −0006∗∗∗ −0006∗∗∗ −0001 −0000 −0000
4000175 4000175 4000115 4000115 4000115
Time −0001∗ −0001∗ −0001∗∗∗ −0001∗∗∗ −0001∗∗∗
4000035 4000035 4000035 4000035 4000035
Lifetime 0001+ 0001∗ 0002∗∗ 0001∗∗ 0001∗∗
4000055 4000055 4000055 4000055 4000055
Initiators’ success experience −0015 0022 0031
4002255 4001945 4001925
Initiators’ failure experience 0033∗∗∗ 0034∗∗∗ 0048∗∗∗
4000435 4000465 4000485
Initiators’ failure experience2 −0001∗∗∗
4000015
Constant 0036∗ 0035∗ −0020 −0019 −0037∗
4001685 4001685 4001745 4001755 4001725
Wald 2 45001∗∗∗ 44098∗∗∗ 97009∗∗∗ 93070∗∗∗ 145052∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0006 0006 0013 0013 0014
Log pseudo-likelihood −899022 −898083 −831085 −831015 −823023
Wald test (variables added to base) 0048 58081∗∗∗ 55002∗∗∗ 101078∗∗∗
Wald test (equality of variables)a 0042 0083
Wald test (quadratic term) 63019∗∗∗
N 1,390 1,390 1,390 1,390 1,390
Clusters 706 706 706 706 706
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
aConcerning equality of effect of initiators’ success and initiators’ failure experience.
+p < 0010; ∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001.
analyses, we used data set A, which excludes all ideas
submitted in the last four years of our observation
period.
We find no support for Hypothesis 1, which proposed
that the success more than the failure of an idea initiator
has a positive impact on repeat initiative taking. A Wald
test, conducted after the coefficient is added in Model 2,
turns out not to be significant. However, we do find a
positive association between an initiator’s failure expe-
rience and repeat initiative taking (Table 4, Model 4:
 = 0034, p ≤ 00001). The Wald 2 value for the vari-
ables added to the base is much higher for Model 3
compared with Model 2 (see Table 4). This indicates that
Model 3, which included the initiators’ failure experi-
ence coefficient, fits the data much better than Model 2,
where initiators’ failure experience was not included but
initiators’ success experience was. However, the Wald
test for equality of variables shows that initiators’ fail-
ure experience is not significantly more positive than
initiators’ success experience (Table 4, Model 4: 2 =
0042, nonsignificant). Of course, this does not take away
the finding that the failure experience coefficient, on
its own, significantly contributes to explaining varia-
tion in the likelihood of initiators to repeatedly take
the initiative.2 The net effect of idea initiators’ fail-
ure experience is depicted in Figure 1 (coefficients are
taken from Model 4; all other variables are held con-
stant at their mean value). The graph shows the positive
but diminishing effect of initiators’ failure experience
Figure 1 Effect of Initiators’ Failure Experience on Repeat
Initiative Taking
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Table 5 Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Repeat
Initiative Taking
Changes in predicted probabilities
Variable Min>Max ±1/2 ±SD/2
Initiators’ program tenure −0001 0000 0000
Number of contributors −0038 −0003 −0004
Similarity to previous 0008 0001 0001
initiatives
Initiative confidentiality 0003 0003 0001
Time elapsed since −0007 0000 −0001
previous initiative
Time −0020 0000 −0005
Lifetime 0022 0000 0004
Initiators’ success 0013 0005 0002
experience
Initiators’ failure 0065 0008 0046
experience
on the predicted probability of repeat initiative taking.
In Table 5, we provide additional detail to interpret the
coefficients taken from Model 4 in Table 4. Specifi-
cally, we report changes in predicted probability as the
independent variable changes (1) from its minimum to
its maximum, (2) from one-half unit below base value
to one-half unit above, and (3) from one-half of the
standard deviation below base to one-half of the stan-
dard deviation above. Note that when the effect of one
variable is calculated, all others are held constant at their
mean value. For example, a change in failure experi-
ence, from one-half unit below base value to one-half
unit above, increases the probability of repeat initiative
taking by 8%. To further explore the unexpected find-
ing of a positive association between initiators’ failure
experience and repeat initiative taking, we also added
a squared term of initiators’ failure experience, which
turns out to be significant (Table 4, Model 5: = −0001,
p≤ 00001). The calculated inflection point appears when
failure experiences reach a value of 27, after which
it begins to have a negative effect on repeat initiative
taking.3
Some initial explanations for our finding that failure
rather than success is positively associated with repeat
initiative taking can be found in the qualitative data
collected on site. In Table 1, we listed some exemplary
statements of recent initiators who we asked whether it
would matter if their idea were a success (accepted) or
a failure (rejected). One initiator, for instance, indicated
that nonacceptance of the idea “can lead to many more
new ideas and projects in the future.” Another person
said, “I’d be even more determined because I want to be
able to get around a problem. I can’t let it go, I want to
solve it.”
Learning and Initiative Success
We use data set B, which excludes all first ideas from
the dependent variable to test the hypotheses related to
the effect of learning on initiative success.
Our results do support Hypotheses 2A and 2B. Hence,
there is a positive effect of prior initiation success expe-
rience on the success of a current initiative for both
potential holders of this experience: the current initiator
(Table 6, Model 8:  = 0055, p ≤ 0001) and the cur-
rent contributors (Table 6, Model 8: = 1005, p≤ 0005).
Joint Wald tests of the respective experiences, conducted
after these coefficients have been added to the baseline
model, indicate statistical significance. We also find sig-
nificant differences between the coefficients of interest.
First, the Wald 2 value for the variables added to the
base is higher for models where the coefficients for ini-
tiators’ prior success experience (Table 6, Model 2 ver-
sus Model 3) and contributors’ prior success experience
is included (Table 6, Model 5 versus Model 6). These
findings indicate that these models fit the data better
than those where initiators’ or contributors’ prior expe-
riences of failure were included. Moreover, running the
Wald test to check for the equality of coefficients indi-
cates that the coefficient for initiators’ prior experiences
of success is significantly more positive than the coeffi-
cient for initiator’s prior experiences of failure (Table 6,
Model 4: 2 = 10026, p ≤ 00001). Also, the contribu-
tors’ prior success experience coefficient is significantly
more positive than the coefficient for contributors’ prior
failure experience (Table 6, Model 7: 2 = 4070, p ≤
0005).4 Figure 2 depicts the net effect of an initiators’
(solid line) and contributors’ prior experiences of suc-
cess (dashed line) on the predicted probabilities of ini-
tiative success, with all other respective variables held
constant at their mean value. The figure shows that the
more experiences in initiating current initiators or con-
tributors have, the higher the positive impact on initiative
success. For Table 7 we recalculated changes in pre-
dicted probability based on Model 8 reported in Table 6.
A change in an initiator’s or contributor’s prior success
experience, from zero to its maximum value, increases
the probability of the initiative success by 44% or 76%,
respectively, with all other variables measured at their
mean value.
Anecdotal evidence from our interviews reported in
Table 1 supports our quantitative findings. One employee
said, “With more successes, I feel that my ideas have
also become much better. Now I immediately think of
the economic aspects of an initiative.” Another initiator
argued that “[i]t’s fun and also an intellectual challenge.
I learn a lot when my ideas progress and are actually
implemented.”
A further investigation of the control variables also
shows some interesting patterns. For instance, initiative
confidentiality has a positive and significant coefficient.
This finding shows that generating an idea that the inno-
vation program aspires helped in the success of that idea.
In other words, the ambition of the innovation program
and the actual implementation of that ambition seemed
to be very well aligned. In additional analyses, we also
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Table 6 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Initiative Success
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Initiators’ program tenure 0003∗∗ 0002∗ 0003∗∗∗ 0002∗∗ 0002∗∗ 0003∗∗ 0002∗∗ 0002∗
4000085 4000085 4000075 4000085 4000085 4000085 4000085 4000085
Number of contributors 0034∗∗∗ 0034∗∗∗ 0034∗∗∗ 0033∗∗∗ 0029∗∗∗ 0036∗∗∗ 0032∗∗∗ 0030∗∗∗
4000725 4000655 4000645 4000615 4000655 4000815 4000825 4000795
Similarity to previous initiatives −0007 −0011 −0005 −0010 −0006 −0007 −0006 −0009
4001455 4001615 4001435 4001605 4001455 4001445 4001445 4001605
Initiative confidentiality 1028∗∗∗ 1028∗∗∗ 1018∗∗∗ 1022∗∗∗ 1022∗∗∗ 1028∗∗∗ 1022∗∗∗ 1017∗∗∗
4002565 4002555 4002545 4002605 4002595 4002565 4002605 4002645
Time elapsed since previous initiative 0000 0001 −0000 0001 0000 0000 0000 0001
4000095 4000105 4000095 4000105 4000105 4000095 4000095 4000115
Time 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
4000065 4000065 4000065 4000065 4000065 4000065 4000065 4000065
Initiators’ prior success experience 0057∗∗ 0054∗∗ 0055∗∗
4001845 4001795 4001835
Initiators’ prior failure experience −0004 −0002 −0002
4000245 4000195 4000185
Contributors’ prior success experience 1011∗ 1015∗ 1005∗
4005355 4005385 4005225
Contributors’ prior failure experience −0001 −0002 −0001
4000205 4000295 4000345
Constant −3073∗∗∗ −3071∗∗∗ −3062∗∗∗ −3064∗∗∗ −3063∗∗∗ −3075∗∗∗ −3067∗∗∗ −3059∗∗∗
4004005 4003995 4003885 4003945 4003945 4004055 4004025 4004005
Wald 2 95081∗∗∗ 111029∗∗∗ 105012∗∗∗ 11805∗∗∗ 86033∗∗∗ 99087∗∗∗ 89049∗∗∗ 101009∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0015 0017 0016 0017 0016 0015 0016 0018
Log pseudo-likelihood −247046 −241077 −245089 −241018 −244030 −247041 −244011 −238030
Wald test (variables added to base) 9071∗∗ 2057 12077∗∗ 4032∗ 0031 4092 16086∗∗
Wald test (equality of variables)a 10026∗∗∗ 9079∗∗
Wald test (equality of variables)b 4070∗ 4005∗
N 887 887 887 887 887 887 887 887
Clusters 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
aConcerning equality of effect of initiators’ prior success and initiators’ prior failure experience.
bConcerning equality of effect of contributors’ prior success and contributors’ prior failure experience.
+p < 0010; ∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001.
explored whether inventor status, as we expected, did
not have a major influence on the outcome of an initia-
tive. To test this, we used a proxy for status. For this we
constructed the percentage of people that have been ini-
tiators of an idea themselves. One could argue that the
position of a group of people working on a particular
Figure 2 Effect of Initiators’ and Contributors’ Prior Success
Experience on Initiative Success
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Table 7 Changes in Predicted Probabilities of
Initiative Success
Changes in predicted probabilities
Variable Min>Max ±1/2 ±SD/2
Initiators’ program tenure 0031 0000 0003
Number of contributors 0056 0002 0002
Similarity to previous −0004 −0001 −0001
initiatives
Initiative confidentiality 0010 0008 0003
Time elapsed since 0007 0000 0001
previous initiative
Time 0001 0000 0000
Initiators’ prior 0044 0004 0002
success experience
Initiators’ prior −0004 0000 −0001
failure experience
Contributors’ prior 0076 0007 0001
success experience
Contributors’ prior −0003 0000 0000
failure experience
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initiative is higher if many of these people have initiated
instead of contributed to a prior idea. However, after
including the proxy to our models, we neither discov-
ered a positive main effect on initiative success nor a
significant moderating influence on the relation between
initiator’s and contributor’s experiences of success and
initiative success. Hence, this finding is also in line with
the purpose of the program, which is to support idea ini-
tiators, independent of their status, who have difficulty
finding support for their risky, radical ideas.
Discussion
In this study we identified that, contrary to our expecta-
tions, initiators’ experience of failure, rather than expe-
rience of success, stimulates future initiation of ideas.
However, we did find confirmation for our hypotheses
that initiators’ and contributors’ successes help to gener-
ate successful ideas. Taking these findings together, we
can conclude that whereas failure in initiating an idea
stimulates people to take the initiative again, prior suc-
cess in initiating an idea is related to better performance
of a subsequent idea. These results offer opportunities
and challenges for scholars and practitioners who are
interested in both repeated and high-quality personal ini-
tiative taking.
Theoretical Implications
Our research explored how learning and continued
action unfold in initiative taking efforts. As we disentan-
gle success from failure, our research extends efforts to
take a closer look at past experience (Madsen and Desai
2010). The findings also respond to calls for more empir-
ical work on the mechanisms of continuous creativity
(Skilton and Dooley 2010). More specifically, our study
shows that inferences employees make from experience
in personal initiative can be counter intuitive (Parker
and Collins 2010). We offer two explanations for this
finding.
First, in proactive activities, extrinsic motives are of
less importance; instead, intrinsic motivation is of utmost
importance (Frese et al. 1999, Morrison and Phelps
1999). When employees experience failure, they will
not so easily give up and might even seek increased
risk if they feel challenged, which might stimulate them
to experiment further and come up with new propos-
als (Mikulincer 1989, Sitkin 1992). Initiators learn that
there is a discrepancy between what is desired and what
has been achieved so far. Assuming that people have
positive outcome expectations when they come up with
a radical initiative, failure of this initiative can lead to
increased persistence (Locke and Latham 1990). Suc-
cessful idea initiators, on the other hand, might be very
busy implementing their idea. Moreover, they might not
feel challenged to generate another idea because they
have accomplished certain learning goals (VandeWalle
and Cummings 1997). People who have success expe-
rience might, therefore, learn less about the need to be
resilient, which could decrease their inclination to take
initiative again (Sitkin 1992).
A second point is that when people voluntarily take
initiative and fail, they actually learn that it is safe to
take more initiative and that there are indeed few, if
any, serious consequences to a failed initiative (Baer and
Frese 2003, Catmull 2008, Edmondson 1999, van Dyck
et al. 2005). Prior initiative failure can also decrease the
threshold to take initiative again because of lower expec-
tations. This may be because the outcomes of an initia-
tive are not visible to a broader audience, which reduces
the need to cope with negative cognitive demands and
the fear of trying again. Prior initiative failure also
decreases the need of employees to practice impression
management, which is considered a barrier to learning
(Van de Ven and Polley 1992). Employees can only,
to a lesser degree, learn this from initiative success.
They never experienced that it is acceptable to sub-
mit an initiative that will potentially fail. As a result,
they could become more careful with initiative taking
efforts. Similarly, previous success may raise the individ-
ual and collective expectations of employees (Locke and
Latham 1990) and thus undermine an initiator’s freedom
of action or scope of search (Skilton and Dooley 2010).
In our additional analyses, we found that employees
in our sample have a very high resilience when it comes
to dealing with failure. However, we also found that
when the number of prior failures is too high, people
might feel less challenged and less motivated to initi-
ate another idea. Instead, they feel increasingly helpless,
lose confidence in their abilities, and relate the activities
to negative emotions. These responses appear to impair
a person’s inclination to continue putting forth personal
initiatives. Entrepreneurship literature has found simi-
lar patterns; for example, research by Ucbasaran et al.
(2009) shows that although a small number of failures
encourage some entrepreneurs to identify more oppor-
tunities, a large number of prior failures decrease their
motivation to start up new businesses.
A context characterized by discretionary behavior may
also offer further explanations for our hypothesized find-
ing that success is more positively associated with subse-
quent initiative success than failure. It seems that expe-
riencing failure does not offer the knowledge necessary
to improve the quality of a future initiative. With failure
experience, employees learn that it is safe to take ini-
tiative again, and accordingly they do, but only success
experience offers initiators the end-to-end, bigger-picture
knowledge that allows them to excel in a new effort
(Kim et al. 2009). Achieving success is a rare event,
but because it has a major impact on the organization
and the initiator, there is a higher willingness to learn
from those experiences (Lampel et al. 2009). One inter-
pretation of why the effect size of contributors versus
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initiators gets larger with more prior success experiences
is that the returns with respect to the lessons that an
inventor can draw from increasing numbers of personal
successes are limited. If one or more contributors with
their own experience of successfully initiating ideas join
the development of a focal idea, they bring with them
different perspectives, strategies that lead to success, and
an understanding of how best to create a match between
an initiative and company requirements. The diversity of
these success experiences might be more valuable than
just the experiences of the initiator alone. Moreover, con-
tributors can serve as helpful mentors and bring with
them symbolic capital, which they can use, for instance,
to raise additional awareness of a focal initiative (Cattani
and Ferriani 2008).
Although the scope of this study focused on rad-
ical ideas, discerning further between different types
of ideas is important because learning from smaller,
improvement-oriented ideas might unfold in a different
way than learning from radical ideas (McGrath 2001).5
The motivation to generate another idea after experienc-
ing many prior failures might, for instance, be higher if
an idea was characterized as very radical. In this case,
initiators could attribute the failure to the nature and
characteristics of the novel idea rather than their personal
skills and abilities. Moreover, failures might induce an
even stronger feeling of being positively challenged to
continue suggesting another initiative if the challenge
a person failed with earlier is considered very disrup-
tive and hence entailed more risks and uncertainties to
begin with (Baer 2012, Mikulincer 1989, Sitkin 1992).
In additional analyses (available from the first author
upon request), we used our data to test whether idea
radicalness had a moderating effect on the relationship
between failure experiences and repeat initiative taking.
Overall, the results show that the likelihood that idea
initiators take the initiative again is more or less inde-
pendent of the idea radicalness.6 Furthermore, it can
be suggested that idea radicalness could also moderate
the relationship between initiators’ prior success experi-
ences and initiative performance. This is because initia-
tors can hardly apply content dimensions of experience
from successful ideas to a new initiative, particularly if
this initiative is radical again. In a radical innovation
context, every idea is different and exploratory learn-
ing is required, which stimulates the creation of inter-
nal variety instead of a “directed search” process, which
highlights the value of intensifying and further expand-
ing initial insights (McGrath 2001). Content knowledge
about a previous initiative can contribute little to build-
ing a new knowledge scaffold, which is necessary to
develop novel, radical ideas. Also, content experience is
difficult-to-transfer, sticky knowledge and therefore may
hinder effective learning for subsequent radical initia-
tive success. Although this argumentation would suggest
a negative moderation of idea radicalness on the rela-
tionship between initiators’ prior success experience and
initiative success, our additional analyses (available from
the first author upon request) provide some evidence,
albeit very weak, for the notion that when working on
a more radical idea, more prior experiences of success
can be conducive to achieving success. One explana-
tion for this finding could be that initiators and contrib-
utors with a track record of many prior successes are
particularly well suited to handle the process-specific,
non-content-related challenges around a novel and radi-
cal idea proposal. However, the interaction showed often
low and ranging marginal effects. When each observa-
tion is looked at separately using the “inteff” command
in Stata (Norton et al. 2004), many were also found to be
nonsignificant. Moreover, since rough proxies were used
to further differentiate among what should be radical
ideas, the interpretation of the revealed effect needs to
be treated with some caution. Hence, further research is
warranted that investigates the whole spectrum of ideas
with more accurate indicators for very incremental or
breakthrough, radical ideas.
Our study is one of the first to directly address learn-
ing behavior for nonrequired activities such as taking ini-
tiative. The findings have implications for other streams
of research studying—for instance, organizational citi-
zenship behavior (Podsakoff et al. 2000), where there
is also the implicit assumption that people make volun-
tary contributions that do not belong within the scope
of their normal tasks. Moreover, our findings can be
applied in contexts where negative outcomes for activ-
ities are not disclosed. Initiative failure is usually not
visible to anyone except the review committee and the
initiators. Another context in which this is the case is
an anonymous submission system for academic articles.
The rejection of a paper might signal authors that further
work is needed, which could challenge them to revise
their manuscript. Authors could have the perception that
they learned from the reviews, and since the prior rejec-
tion is not visible to a broader audience, they are free to
submit the manuscript to another journal.
Managerial Implications
Burgelman (1988) shows that “top management should
be alert to proposals that emerge deep in the organiza-
tion because they are likely to reveal unrealized aspects
of its capabilities and associated opportunities” (p. 83).
Hence, initiative taking should be continuously utilized
and supported. However, management may be afraid that
initiative reviewing bodies can become a serious threat
for repeat initiative taking because these reviewing bod-
ies need to reject many initiatives, as not all are equally
worth developing. However, our research shows that the
decision not to accept the majority of initiatives has a
positive rather than a negative influence on the inclina-
tion of proactive individuals to submit another initiative.
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Whereas prior initiating failure stimulates people to take
initiative again, only prior initiating success is related
to better initiative outcomes. The managerial implica-
tion is significant: if failure reinforces more initiatives
that are similar to prior ones, an assessment system of
ideas will, at some point, be cluttered by bad initiatives.
This places a heavy administrative burden on managers
who need to go through and review all those initiatives.
Moreover, companies cannot afford to have too many
resources allocated to low-quality initiatives.
One remedy that emerged from our results is to
include previously successful contributors in a new per-
sonal initiative. Experienced organizational members can
share lessons learned to help improve an initiative’s
chances of success. The more success experiences they
have, the more they might serve as mentors, guiding,
for instance, less experienced inventors through the pro-
cess and thereby serving as role models. More gener-
ally, we also found a positive effect from an increased
number of contributors on initiative success. These find-
ings point toward the importance of social network size
as a catalyst for collaborative learning and knowledge
exchange to improve creative outcomes (Hargadon and
Bechky 2006, Kijkuit and Van den Ende 2010). Com-
panies can steer network building and the systematic
involvement of prior successful initiators by designing
mentorship programs where initiators are assigned to
previously successful initiators. This can also have the
advantage that by being exposed to these new initiatives,
previously successful people can identify novel oppor-
tunities in their own and others’ knowledge pools (Har-
gadon and Bechky 2006). Moreover, the general findings
of our study could imply that more attention needs to be
paid to a targeted feedback strategy. For example, idea
evaluators could elaborate more with failed initiators on
why an initiative was not accepted and which general
criteria have to be met before another idea is submitted.
Initiators that succeeded should receive more motiva-
tional feedback so that they continue taking initiative.
From our observations and interviews, we can con-
clude that Enco seems to have managed to create a
feeling of high safety and install a positive climate
that promotes initiative taking despite many prior idea
failures (Baer and Frese 2003, Burgelman 1983, Cat-
mull 2008, Edmondson 1999). Employees also value the
climate within Enco’s innovation program very much.
In semistructured interviews, many recent idea origina-
tors said that they are not afraid of an idea failing (see
Table 1 for exemplary statements). Moreover, the evalua-
tion process is perceived as fair. For instance, one person
said, “The process is very efficient, easy, and fair. I must
say I’m pretty impressed by it, and whenever I have
a new idea, I’ll approach the review committee again.”
Thus, a safe environment and a culture that does not
punish failures can be important facilitators for learning.
Other managers are advised to support similar policies if
they want to maximize initiators’ learning effect based
on a prior initiative’s success or failure. Error manage-
ment training programs might be important to move an
organization in that direction (see Keith and Frese 2008,
van Dyck et al. 2005).
Limitations and Future Research
There are some limitations of our study that present
opportunities for future research. A first concern could
be that the stage at which we chose to mark success only
provides the initiator with another green light for an even
longer journey. The second panel approval stage never-
theless marks an important point in the life of an idea
because most useless or noninnovative ideas are sorted
out well before this point. It is therefore a major suc-
cess to get more serious managerial and financial support
when the process of review for 90% of the other ideas
has halted. However, an idea labeled as “failure” can still
lead to subsequent successes, and vice versa, an adopted
initiative can still turn out to be a failure (Van de Ven
and Polley 1992). The case of 3M is a famous exam-
ple where early applications for a new type of glue were
unsuccessful, and only later on, after discovering a dif-
ferent use for this glue, an extremely successful product
was launched. In this study we focused on the generation
and further refinement of ideas, not their implementation.
It is therefore an interesting question to explore what hap-
pens with successful and failed ideas after they have been
classified as such. However, we believe that because of
the voluntary nature of initiative taking, the incentives
proactive initiators have to push forward for a rejected
idea might be less than those of, for instance, engineers
at 3M, whose job it is to search for commercialization
options for ideas that received substantial funding and
who might therefore be more dependent on the ultimate
performance outcome of initiatives. An interesting ques-
tion is also whether the sequence of success or failure
affects repeat initiative taking and initiative success. Our
theory and analysis is based on the assumption that the
more experiences of success someone has accumulated,
the higher the likelihood of repeat initiative taking and
initiative success, but we additionally explored whether
a change in the two most recent initiatives (i.e., first
experiencing failure then success, or vice versa) would
affect our two dependent variables. The results confirm
that a change (positive or negative) concerning the two
most recent initiatives does not significantly affect repeat
initiative taking or the success of the focal initiative.
However, we encourage future researchers to investigate
this issue further using potentially longer and different
sequence strings.
Other interesting opportunities for future research lie
in the comparison of radical and incremental ideas and
potentially different ways of learning across these ini-
tiatives. Our research scope was on radical initiatives,
and further separating these initiatives into less and more
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radical did not prove to have a major (moderating) influ-
ence on either repeat initiative taking or initiative suc-
cess. However, a next step could be to test the same
hypotheses in a context where employees are encour-
aged to also generate more incremental improvement
ideas. Linking the exploration of this new data to the ear-
lier issue of idea implementation could be another path
worth pursuing. The implementation of a radical idea
might look very different than the implementation and
commercialization of an incremental idea. For instance,
it might be much more difficult to implement a radical
idea because of higher internal opposition.
We also conducted this study in one large organization
with the advantage of being able to hold organizational
context factors constant. However, one could argue that
people’s motivation to commit and voluntarily contribute
to an innovation management program might be con-
tingent on internal incentive structures, organizational
routines, or the organizational culture and how errors
are handled in that organization in general (Baer and
Frese 2003, Frese 1995, Keith and Frese 2008, van Dyck
et al. 2005). However, our question was to investigate
what initiative originators learned from success or fail-
ure once they submitted an initiative. Focusing on the
performance outcomes of initiative taking is in that sense
a viable approach and consistent with earlier research
designs (e.g., Cattani and Ferriani 2008), but to cap-
ture the full driving forces of personal initiative, further
research is warranted about the idea initiators’ internal
processes as well as how inventors shape and are shaped
by the environment. Research in this area could, for
instance, explore how social skills influence the degree
of feedback idea inventors receive or how their associa-
tive thinking skills trigger learning processes. It can be
argued that the personality of idea originators as well
as organizational context, incentive structures, and error
management culture can enhance or diminish the effect
of success and failure on repeat initiative taking or ini-
tiative success. However, we do not think that the direc-
tion of the effect will change. Research by Miron et al.
(2004), for instance, confirms that innovation culture
enhances the effect of individual creativity on individual
innovation performance. High innovation culture created
a steeper slope, but the slope for low innovation cul-
ture was still positive. This finding also leads us to the
conclusion that our results should be generalizable to
other companies, or at least to those who have innova-
tion management programs in place. Although the pro-
grams are not a prerequisite, having these structures in
place sends out a clear signal that a company is open for
the suggestions and ideas from their employees. Finally,
organizational cultures and climates may change over
time, and a strength of our study is that it covers a time
span of 12 years. We found that the relationship held
while controlling for a time variable, which indicates the
month the initiative was submitted since the inception of
the database. This gives some additional evidence for the
generalizability of our findings to other firms. Still, an
opportunity for future research includes examining the
proposed moderating effect of company context and/or
initiator personality on learning magnitude.
Unfortunately, we were not able to measure the
antecedents of taking personal initiative and therefore
could not disentangle the effect of personality or work
environment on learning from initiative taking (Parker
et al. 2006, 2010). Although we know that ability and
desire to take initiative is an important selection crite-
rion for new hires at Enco, we are limited to giving rec-
ommendations on what companies need to do to design
a proactive, initiative taking workforce. Moreover, our
analysis is restricted by having limited demographic data
of the idea initiators. So a concern could be that peo-
ple higher in the organizational ladder could manage to
have more leeway and control over strategic resources,
which could help them in succeeding with their ini-
tiative. However, continuing with this example, higher-
ranked people do not necessarily need to submit their
ideas to the innovation program because they can develop
them without the assistance and financial backing of the
program. Therefore, this issue is less significant. Also,
Enco’s innovation program is an independent unit in the
company that is measured by its ability to execute a select
number of ideas that are outside the scope of the cur-
rent business strategy. Accomplishing this goal is only
possible by sponsoring high-quality ideas independent
of the position, rank, or status of the employee in the
organization. Because of the features and structure of
the innovation program, which is accessible to every-
body inside the company, the need for internal selling
of an idea by an originator to a decision maker is less
prevalent (De Clercq et al. 2011). Future research, how-
ever, could explore the issue of initiative selling and the
influence of inventors’ status or power in organizations
where there is not an independent innovation program
in place. These limitations notwithstanding, our research
illustrates how initiative taking, if it is shown, can be
channeled, improved, and best utilized on a continuous
basis.
Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge the feedback and help of
many of their colleagues in developing this article, includ-
ing Michael Jensen, Daan Stam, Markus Baer, Maria Dijkstra,
Christine Moser, Julie Birkholz, Julie Ferguson, and Nicoletta
Dimitrova. The authors are indebted to managers and employ-
ees of the research site who continuously supported them in
collecting and analyzing the data presented in this article.
Finally, they thank the senior editor, Zur Shapira, and the two
anonymous reviewers for their many excellent and construc-
tive comments and suggestions throughout the review process.
Endnotes
1Although we focus on these mechanisms, this is not to say
that learning cannot take place through other processes nor
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that performance outcomes might be sufficient to capture and
predict how learning will unfold, as some of the early learning
literature in this field might have suggested. In fact, we appre-
ciate the comment by an anonymous reviewer who pointed out
that mind and personality, specific skills, or intelligence level,
for instance, might influence how people learn either to con-
tinue taking the initiative or to generate better initiatives over
time.
2For robustness (all results are available from the first author
upon request), we tested for a potentially quadratic effect of
initiators’ success experience on repeat initiative taking, which
we did not, however, discover. Moreover, we reoperationalized
repeat initiative taking using different time windows (i.e., idea
submission after two or six years following a prior submission)
and found again that our results held. Additionally, we investi-
gated whether there is a structural difference between employ-
ees who are very active in proposing ideas and those who
propose very few ideas and are not very productive. We calcu-
lated our proxy measure productivity by 4n− 15/4t2 − t1 + 15,
where n is the total number of ideas a person initiated, t1 the
time (in months) of initiating the very first idea, and t2 the time
(in months) the very last idea was generated. We added one
month to handle cases in which two ideas were submitted in
the same month. Then, we ran analyses on samples excluding
people whose degree of productivity was 0.5, 1, or 1.5 above
the average. We also ran a model where we focused only on
the first three ideas of an initiator, plus one in which, in addi-
tion to including only the first three ideas of an initiator, we
also excluded initiators with an above-average (0.30) produc-
tivity score. All the analyses confirm that an initiator’s prior
experience of failure is significantly related to an increased
submission of subsequent ideas.
3In different robustness checks, we also added the squared
term for initiators’ failure experience. The squared term was
significant where we excluded from the data set people who
were 0.5, 1, or 1.5 times above the average in terms of produc-
tivity (see endnote 2 for further details on the operationaliza-
tion of productivity). Because of these restrictions, the inflec-
tion point moved slightly. For the data set where we excluded
people with a degree of productivity 1.5 above the average,
the inflection point was at 21 failed experiences. The same
inflection point was found for an analysis where we excluded
above-average productive people. Using a data set comprising
only initiators with less than 0.5 below the sample average for
productivity, we found an inflection point at 9 failed experi-
ences. In data sets where we focused only on the first three
ideas, we still found a significant linear effect but no longer
found a significant curvilinear effect. Together, the additional
analyses confirm that there is an inflection point for every
group, just that the actual number may vary.
4Again, we checked for robustness (results are available from
the first author upon request). First, we did not encounter
any quadratic relationships between the initiators’ prior suc-
cess experience or contributors’ prior success experience and
initiative success. Second, using a different operationalization
for this dependent variable also confirmed our earlier findings.
Specifically, we regressed on initiative lifetime since the length
of an initiative process might be an indication of how far an
idea had made it in the development and hence might also be
a sign of success. Finally, we ran different models excluding
people whose degree of productivity (see endnote 2 for further
details on the operationalization of productivity) was 0.5, 1, or
1.5 above the average, where we included only the first few
ideas of initiators, and where we additionally excluded initia-
tors with a productivity degree above the average. Overall, the
results confirm the general tendencies observed with the full
data of data set B. It is noteworthy that a model including
productivity as an additional control variable shows that this
variable did not turn out to have a significant influence on
initiative success. However, initiators’ and contributors’ prior
success experience remained significant predictors of initiative
success. One could argue that because of a higher productivity,
idea originators produce more behavior, which then leads to
more feedback, which then might lead to higher performance.
However, in our data this is not confirmed, meaning that
just being active and submitting many ideas does not matter
for initiative success. Indeed, highly productive people either
might not be interested in learning from prior idea outcomes
or might not be able to transfer the lessons of specific idea-
related feedback to a new idea. To further validate this finding,
we also conducted additional analyses with a proxy for feed-
back. In Enco’s innovation management program, comments
by other participants and the formal feedback of the innova-
tion group are archived. By counting the number of comments
recorded for every idea, we created a proxy for feedback inten-
sity for an idea. We ran negative binomial regression analyses
with the count variable feedback as the dependent variable.
The results show that the success or failure of an idea is not
significantly related to receiving more or less feedback. More-
over, taking prior idea feedback as an independent variable
and initiative success as a dependent variable, the coefficient
of feedback is very small and not significant ( = −00001,
nonsignificant). Including this feedback proxy did not signif-
icantly change the other results reported in the paper. Taken
together, this supports the notion that it is difficult to use spe-
cific feedback on a previous idea in order to help the devel-
opment of a new and different one. Moreover, it shows that
the innovation management program team treated every idea
in a similar way in terms of the feedback provided, whether
the idea itself was successful or not. Interviews with initiators
and Enco’s innovation managers confirm that every initiative
is taken seriously, no matter how often an initiator approaches
the review committee or how low-key the initiative seems to
be at the beginning. The review committee always wants to
give constructive feedback to the initiators, and many valued
this, as indicated by some statements included in Table 1. For
instance, one interviewee said, “ I expect that the people who
evaluate my idea have a much broader overview of what’s
worthwhile to pursue. I’ve got a lot of faith in the process and
think there’s probably some good reason behind a rejection.”
5We appreciate the advice from an anonymous reviewer to
focus on the potentially contingent effect of initiative type (i.e.,
incremental versus radical initiatives).
6Specifically, we tested whether two aspects of radicalness,
which can be identified in our data, had a moderating effect
on the relationship between failure or success experiences and
repeat initiative taking. These aspects of idea radicalness con-
cern what degree of confidentiality an idea is given within
Enco and how similar it seems when compared with earlier
ones by the same initiator. The analyses, however, reveal no
clear and consistent pattern. The variable initiative confiden-
tiality had no significant effect, whereas similarity to previous
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initiatives had, at best, a very marginal moderating influence
on the relationship between initiators’ failure experiences and
repeat initiative taking. Moreover, and as expected, the influ-
ence of success experiences on repeat initiative taking was
not activated by the two indicators for initiative radicalness.
The latter finding can be expected because if positive feedback
has a reinforcing effect for behavior and motivation, it should
hold, regardless of the nature of the activity itself (see Audia
and Goncalo 2007).
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